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LAW REVIEW
OF FLORIDA Lump
UNIVERSITY
adopted when partnerships were typically small, centralized units.212 Although
this contention has merit, taxpayers should likewise not be forced to operate
under procedures that effectively deprive them of the flexibility that was intentionally drafted into Subchapter K. 213 Faced with the consequences of the
Treasury proposal, taxpayers may choose to avoid the partnership form in
selecting a medium for investment. Should investors eschew investment partnerships, many public programs financed through partnerships that are granted
14
favorable tax treatment will be harmed.2
The problems encountered by the IRS are nevertheless significant and do
require attention. 21 5 Inefficiency in the assessment of taxes affects all taxpayers;
therefore, a system should be adopted that is efficient yet sensitive to the rights
of individual partners. The right to determine one's own tax is fundamental
in our system of taxation.lls Any procedure which significantly hampers this
right should be scrutinized carefully before adoption.
MICHAEL H. DAVIs

DEFERRED COMPENSATION: LUMP SUM
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM DISQUALIFIED PLANS
INTRODUCTION

Since 1921,1 Congress has sought to aid employees by creating tax advantages
for certain employee retirement benefit plans. 2 Historically, the concept was
simple: an employee retirement plan that met certain requirements qualifying
it for special tax treatment entitled employers to a current deduction for their
contributions to the plan 3 and allowed employees to defer taxation until plan
212. See Statement, supra note 21, at 5.
213. See supra note 102.
214. For example, many government-subsidized low-income housing projects are constructed and operated by publicly-owned limited partnerships. Investors are attracted to such
projects by favorable tax attributes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1976) (mitigation of
depreciation recapture where property disposed of is subsidized housing for lower-income
families). If the limited partnership vehicle is unavailable, or too cumbersome, investors may
choose to avoid it rather than risk exposure to harsh consequences of the partnership-level
audit.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 6-78.
216. See, e.g., B. BITfKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (1954).
1. A provision on stock and profit sharing plans was included in the Revenue Act of
1921, but was a section of only 12 lines, hidden among the rules pertaining to trusts in
general. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(0, 42 Stat. 227, 296. See also Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 49
TAXEs 226 (1971).
2. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 784 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1981) (the avowed purpose of Congress is to aid employees in preparing for retirement);
Freyburger, Pension Plans- The Philosophy of Section 165(a), 22 TAXES 60 (1944) (discussing
congressional policy behind early employee trust provisions).
3. See Goodman, supra note I, at 227. For a discussion of early cases allowing corporations to deduct contributions to employee trusts as ordinary and necessary business expense,
see Griswold, The Tax Treatment of Employees' Contributions To Pension Plans, 57 HAv.
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benefits were actually received. 4 The current tax treatment of qualified plans
has changed little, despite significant changes in the criteria for obtaining
qualified status.5
In addition to the advantage of deferred taxation, current tax treatment
allows certain tax advantages for lump-sum distributions from a qualified
plan.8 When an employee receives all of his qualified plan benefits in a single
tax year, he is entitled to favorable tax treatment.7 Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),8 a lump-sum distribution from
a qualified plan is subject to either capital gains treatment or income averaging.9 A lump-sum distribution from a nonqualified plan, however, is taxed as
ordinary income.V 0
The appropriate tax treatment of lump-sum distributions from nonqualified
plans that were formerly qualified is unclear."' After presenting the historical
development of this problem, the judicial treatment of qualified/nonqualified
lump-sum distributions will be examined. This note will then seek to outline
the appropriate treatment of the problem.

L. REv. 247 (1943). See also Elgin Nat'1 Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 339 (1929);
Live Stock Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 413 (1927); Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett &
Co. v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 464 (1926).
4. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 227.
5. See, e.g., Trebotich v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1974). The term
"qualified plan" is a term of art, referring to those plans which meet I.R.C. § 401(a) (1976 &
Supp. III, as amended by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) §§ 311, 314) requirements and thus are granted tax advantages. See Goodfellow, The Tax Consequences of
Pension Trusts and Employer Purchased Annuities to Employee or Beneficiary, 39 CAL. L.
Riv. 204 (1951). Throughout this note, the term "qualified plan" will be used interchangeably with the terms "exempt trust," "defined benefit plan," and "defined contribution plan."
6. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), (e)(4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979 as amended
by ERTA § 311(b)(2), (c)(2)); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(l)(ii); T.D. 6823, 1965-1 C.B. 176-77.
See also Chadwick, Taxation of Certain Lump Sum Distributions,28 TAx LAw. 555 (1975).
For a discussion of the advantages of tax deferral, see Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HAgv. L. Ray. 1113, 1126 (1974).

7. For a payment from a trust to constitute a lump-sum distribution, it must be (1) paid
from a qualified plan or exempt trust, (2) paid totally to the credit of the employee, (3) paid
within one taxable year to the recipient, and (4) paid to the recipient because of the employee's death, attainment of age 59h, separation from service, or disability. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)
(A) (1976 as amended by ERTA § 311(b)(2), (c)(2)). See also Chadwick, supra note 6, at 559;
Mezzullo, The Taxation of DistributionsFrom Qualified Employee Benefit Plans, 11 U. Ricm.
L. Ray. 233, 234-38 (1977).
8. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III

1979).
9. 1.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also Boggs, Qualified Plans Under
ERISA: Tax Shelter or BureaucraticPaper Chase?, 14 U. RicH. L. Rxv. 709 (1980); Kopple &
Veenhuis, An Analysis of Lump-Sum DistributionsAfter the Pension Reform Legislation, 42
J. TAX'N 2 (1975); Wangard, Selecting A Qualified Plan After ERISA: The Alternatives, Problems and Costs, 43 J. TAx'N 145 (1975).
10. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976).
11. See Stogel & Ervin, Keeping the Qualified Pension Plan Qualified and Recognizing
the Tax Effects of Disqualification, 1977 WAsH. U.L.Q. 565. See also Hesse v. United States,
81-1 U.S. TAx CAs. (CCH) ff 9153 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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HisToRICAL PERSPECTIVE

Deferral of taxation on benefits from qualified plans was enacted into law
in 1921.12 The Revenue Act of 1942, however, first established the foundation
and philosophy underlying present tax treatment of retirement benefits.' 13 Prior
to the 1942 Act, employers could establish pension plans benefiting only highly
paid executives and still deduct contributions currently. 4 Benefits were then
taxed at substantially lower :rates when distributed to the executive.15 Thus, the
tax advantages which Congress intended for all employees were being used as a
tax shield for highly paid executives and other key employees.
PhillipsH. Lord, Inc. v. Commissioner,16 decided by the Tax Court in 1942,
illustrates the statutory loophole that existed under prior law.' 7 In addition to
owning all of the voting stock of Phillips H. Lord, Inc.,'5 the taxpayer was the
corporation's president, treasurer, and highest paid employee.,9 In 1937, the
corporation established a pension trust, paying $14,769 for the acquisition of
annuity contracts. 20 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the
$14,769 payment as a deduction from the corporation's gross income, asserting
that the taxpayer was the principal beneficiary under the trust.2 1 The Com-

missioner further maintained that the trust was not created for the exclusive
benefit of the corporation's employees, as required by section 165 of the Revenue Act of 1936. 22 The Tax Court held, however, that the trust was a true

pension trust within the meaning of section 165 and that the corporation was
entitled to the deduction.2 3 Moreover, the taxpayer would not be individually
taxable until there was an actual distribution from the trust. 24 This loophole,

coupled with the discriminatory use of retirement plans for the benefit of

12. See supra note 1. Under the Revenue Act of 1921, the provision for exempt employee
trusts was limited in scope to stock or profit-sharing plans. The Revenue Act of 1926, however,
expanded the provision to include pension plans. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(f), 442

Stat. 933. See also Griswold, supra note 3, at 247.
13. See Goodfellow, supra note 5, at 204. See also Freyburger, supra note 2, at 60; Goodman, supra note 1, at 227.
14. Goodman, supra note 1, at 227. See also Phillips H. Lord, Inc. v. Commissioner, I
T.C. 286 (1942); Princess Garment Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C.M. (CCH) 186 (1942). But see
Perkins v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1051 (1947); Anderson v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1317 (1945);
Hubbell v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 626 (1944); Parker v, Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 989 (1938).
See generally Cornfeld, Qualified Plan Distributions, Restricted Property, and Accumulation
Trusts, 23 TAx LAw. 539 (1970).
15. See Goodfellow, supra note 5, at 204. See also Moore v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 1073
(1941).

16.

1 T.C. 286 (1942).

17.

Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 165, 49 Stat. 1648, 1707. See also Goodman, supra note

1, at 228.
18.

1 T.C. at 290.

19.

Id.

20. Id.
21. Id. $9,750 out of the $14,769 was used to purchase contracts for Lord. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 292.
24. Id.
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shareholders and directors, established an inequity that Congress sought to
correct through the Revenue Act of 1942.25
The Revenue Act of 1942
Section 165(a) of the 1942 Act designated pension plans as either qualified
or nonqualified.2 6 This section prohibited qualified pension trusts from being
used for the exclusive benefit of shareholders, officers, and highly compensated
employees.27 By introducing the concept of prohibited discrimination, Congress
endeavored to insure that qualified plans were operated for the welfare of general employees. 28 To achieve qualified status, a plan had to include 70 percent
of all full-time employees.
In Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner,3o the Ninth Circuit developed a test to
determine whether a plan was properly structured.2 1 The proper focus, according to the court, was whether plan benefits were either prejudiced in favor of
highly compensated employees or being used to increase the employer's indirect benefits.3 2 Hence, the court's decision, rendered after the 1942 Act,
created greater protection for general employees in the area of retirement
benefits.
The 1942 Act also extended capital gains treatment to lump-sum distribu-

25. See Goodfellow, supra note 5, at 204. See also Goodman, supra note 1, at 227-29. For
a general discussion of the historical development of the employee's exempt trust, see 4A
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAxATION,

§ 25B.01-.64

(1972 ed.).

26. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165, 56 Stat. 798, 862. The basic provisions for qualified
plans remained essentially unchanged, albeit somewhat expanded, under the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. The 1954 Code removed the provision for exemption from the qualification
area, transferring it to the section dealing 'with exempt organizations. Thus, a trust qualified
under I.R.C. § 401(a) (1976 ScSupp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA §§ 312(b)(1), 335, 338(a))
is exempt under I.R.C. § 501(a) (1976), unless exemption is denied under I.R.C. § 502 (1976)
(dealing with feeder organizations) or I.R.C. § 503 (1976) (prohibited transactions). See Goodman, supra note 1, at 236. The 1954 Code added new and more stringent requirements for
qualified plans. I.R.C. §§ 502 8: 503 (1976). See McClintock-Trunkey Co. v. Commissioner, 217
F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Produce Rep. Co., 207 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953);
Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.
1951).
27. See Goodfellow, supra note 5, at 205; Goodman, supra note 1. at 230-32. See also
Lasser & Rothschild, Deferred Compensation for Executives, 33 HARv. Bus. Rav. 89 (1955);
Comment, Implementing Policy Objectives in the Taxation of Deferred Compensation Arrangements, 78 DuLUJ. 1460 (1978).
28. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 137, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 541; H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 103, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372. See also Goodman, supra
note 1, at 230.
29. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165(a)(3)(A), 56 Stat. 798, 862 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(1)(A) (1976).
30. 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
31. Id. at 238. See also Stogel &Ervin, supra note 11, at 572.
32. 258 F.2d at 238. In determining whether a plan is operated for the exclusive benefit
of the eligible employees, Treas. Reg. § 1A01-1b)(3), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 222, 225, provides
that "all of the surrounding and attendant circumstances and details of the plan" should be
considered. This approach supports the position advanced in Time Oil.
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tions33 Reception of a large amount of income in a single tax year would
place the employee in a higher tax bracket and subject him to a higher tax
rate.3 4 Congress sought to mitigate this adverse consequence of lump-sum distributions s 5 Thus, section 165(b) provided that, when an employee received a
lump-sum distribution from. a qualified plan, the amount received in excess of
the employee's contributions to the plan would be taxed as gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset.3 6 This decision was viewed as a simple solution
37
to the income-bunching problem lump-sum distributions promoted.
The Self-Employed Individuals
Tax Retirement Act of 1962
In 1962, Congress passed the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
Act, 38 which extended favorable tax treatment to retirement plans for selfemployed individuals8s Under this Act, lump-sum distributions to self-employed individuals were taxed as ordinary income, subject to five-year forward
averaging. 40 The 1962 Act resulted in different treatment of lump-sum distributions, depending on whether the recipient was an employee or a self-employed
individual.
From 1964 to 1969, the capital gains treatment accorded to lump-sum distributions from employee qualified plans was heavily criticized. 4' Critics argued
that there was no rationale for the differing treatment afforded regular employees vis-a-vis the self-employed. 42 The main contention was that deferred
compensation, whether received by an employee or a self-employed individual,
constituted compensation for services,43 which should be taxed as ordinary
33. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 615, § 165(b), 56 Stat. 798, 863. See also Goodfellow, supra
note 5, at 210; Goodman, supra note I, at 234.
34. See Chadwick, supra note 6, at 555.
35. See generally S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 607.
See also Chadwick, supra note 6, at 555.
36. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165(b), 56 Stat. 798, 863.
37. For a discussion of the income-bunching problem, see Chadwick, supra note 6, at 556.
38. Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962).
39. I.R.C. § 501(c) (1976). See also Goodman, supra note 1, at 240.
40. The 1962 Act for the self-employed introduced income averaging as a means of
mitigating the adverse effects of bunched income. Because the individual income tax rates
are progressive, substantially more in income taxes are paid on a lump-sum distribution than
would be paid if the distribution were spread, and thus taxed, evenly over the years of the
accumulation period. This occurs because the larger the distribution, the larger the proportion taken under the progressive rates as income tax. Hence, the total tax on a lump-sum
distribution was theoretically the equivalent of the tax on five equal distributions, each
separately taxed over a five-year period. This is the essence of income averaging as applied
to lump-sum distributions, regardless of the number of years involved. See I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)
(A)-(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (illustrating the current averaging treatment of lump-sum
distributions). See also J. FREELAND, S. LIND, & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 623 (3d ed. 1981).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 154, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1645, 1806; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 201, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2235.
42. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 6, at 556.
43. See supra note 41.
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income,44 and not accorded more favorable tax treatment than that applicable
to compensation received currently.45 A further criticism was that taxation of
lump-sum distributions at capital gains rates afforded the greatest benefits to
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $50,000.4 6 In response to
these criticisms, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969
Under the Tax Reform Act of 196947 capital gains treatment was accorded
only to that portion of a lump-sum distribution attributable to contributions
made prior to 1970.48 The portion of the distribution attributable to contributions made after 1969 was treated as ordinary income, subject to seven-year
forward averaging.4- Any appreciation, interest, or dividends attributable to
post-1969 employer contributions, however, still received capital gains treatment.10 While the conversion from capital gains to averagable ordinary income
was conceptually sound,5' the averaging device created by the 1969 Act was so
complex that it was virtually unusable. 52 Furthermore, the Act left unchanged
the special averaging method applicable to the self-employed. 53 Consequently,
the illogical distinction between regular employees and self-employed individ-

uals persisted.
The Employment Retirement
Security Act of 1974
Continued criticism from academicians, as well as complaints from taxpayers and tax practitioners, prompted Congress to completely overhaul the
tax treatment of lump-sum distributions. This overhauling was accomplished
by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."4 Prior
44. Id.
45. See H.R. RPa. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 146, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4670,4811. See also Chadwick, supra note 6, at 556.
46. See H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 45. See also Chadwick, supra note 6, at 557.

47. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
48. See Chandwick, supranote 6, at 557.
49. Id.

50. See Goodman, supranote 1, at 247.
51. See Chadwick, supranote 6, at 557.
52. The complexity of the averaging device created by the 1969 Act is illustrated by the
fact that the Treasury Department experienced considerable difficulty in formulating the
necessary regulations to determine the capital gains and ordinary income elements of a
distribution. See S. REP. No. 883, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 188, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
&AD. NEws 4890, 5021. In fact, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee both noted that the Treasury Department had published two sets of proposed
regulations relating to the determination of the amount of tax on the ordinary income portion of a lump-sum distribution. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 807, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. 148, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4670, 4812.

58. See Chadwick, supranote 6, at 558.
54. Pub. L. No. 98-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1976) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1381 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). For a more complete discussion of ERISA, its effects and implications, see
generally R. BILDERSEE, PENSION REGuLATION MANUAL (rev. ed. 1979); N. LEviN, ERISA AND
LABOR MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDs (2d rev. ed. 1975); D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE ON
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to ERISA, retirement plans qualifying for favored tax treatment were classified
as either pension plans or profit-sharing plans. 55 ERISA produced two new
classifications for pension benefit plans: defined contribution plans and defined
benefit plans.56
A defined contribution plan provides an individual account for each plan
participant. 5 Under a defined contribution plan, benefits consist solely of the
amount contributed to the participant's account, plus any earnings attributable
thereto.5 8 Upon retirement, the participant will merely receive his account
balance. 59 Profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and money-purchase plans
are all examples of defined contribution plans.6 0
A defined benefit plan is any plan that is not a defined contribution plan. 61
A defined benefit plan specifies from the outset the amount of benefits it will
pay upon retirement62 Annual contributions to the plan are therefore mandatory, since the employer must contribute the amounts necessary to provide
the fixed, future benefit.6s The annual contribution amount is based on
4
actuarial assumptions and plan experience.
In general, pension plans may be thought of as representative of defined
CORPORATE BENEFIT PLANS
YOND

(1980);

(1979); J.

PRACTICING LAW

MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, ERISA, AND BE-

INSTITUTE,

INTRODUCTION

TO QUALIFIED PENSION

AND PROFIT-

SHARING PLANS (1979).

55. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1970). ERISA did not eliminate traditional classifications but merely
introduced new terminology. See Boggs, supra note 9, at 711. See generally Cheek, ERISA Opportunities for New Liberalities in Pension Planning, 81 Com. L.J. 290 (1976); Goodman,
New Minimum Standards Under the Pension Reform Act of 1974, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 217
(1975); Kopple & Veenhuis, supra note 9; Lamon & Lee, Pre-Retirement Qualified Plan Payouts
Under ERISA, 9 CuM. L. REV. 83 (1978); Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219 (1975); Note, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Brave
New World of Retirement Security, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1044 (1975); Comment, The Tax
Consequences of DistributionsFrom Retirement Plans,26 CATH. U.L. REv. 319 (1977).
56. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(55) (1976).
57. Id. See also Goodman, Defined Contribution Plans Under ERISA, 1980 PENS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH), No. 197, at 1f19 (Jan. 5, 1979). See generally Rothschild, Distributions from
Defined ContributionPlans,34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 195 (1976) (ERISA Supp.).
58. See Goodman, supra note 57, at 1118. See also Boggs, supra note 9, at 712.
59. See Goodman, supra note 57.
60. See Boggs, supra note 9, at 712. Under a defined contribution plan, there is no requirement for a fixed, mandatory contribution each year. Consequently, the plan affords considerable flexibility, allowing the employer's contribution to vary from year to year, depending on the existence of earnings and profits, or be omitted during a year in which there are
no earnings and profits. Id.
61. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976). See generally D'Aleo & Rosenberg, Defined Benefit
Keough Plans: Advantages the Offer; Drawbacks they Entail, 53 J. TAX'N 42 (1980).
62. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976).
63. Id. Failure to fund the mandatory amount will result in the imposition of penalties
upon the employer. For a discussion of penalty taxes and minimum funding standards, see
Boggs, supra note 9, at 725.
64. Boggs, supra note 9, at 712. For a discussion of the minimum funding standards, as
well as the actuarial factors, involved in determining the employer's annual contribution, see
CANAN, QUALIFIED RErIPEMENTS PLANS §§ 12.1-12.8 (1977 and Supp. 1979); Emering, Actuarial
Cost Factors and Description of Funding Methods, in INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PENSION
AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS 245 (1979).
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benefit plans. Similarly, profit-sharing plans are illustrative of defined contribution plans.5 Although the defined contribution plan and the defined benefit
plan differ, ERISA extends lump-sum treatment to both.s
ERISA, via I.R.C. § 402(e)(1), 67 treats lump-sum distributions in two ways.
First, the portion of the distribution attributable to post-1973 years is taxed as
ordinary income subject to ten-year averaging. 68 Second, the portion allocable
to pre-1974 years may be treated as capital gains or averaged with other income
under I.R.C. §§ 1301-1304.9 The allocation between the pre-1974 and post-1973
periods is based on the relationship between the number of years of employee
participation during the two periods7 o Consequently, computational horrors
created by the 1969 Tax Reform Act were avoided.71 Additionally, the indefensible distinction between regular employees and self-employed individuals
was abolished, due more to an interest in simplification than theoretical
72

purity.

65. See Boggs, supranote 9, at 712.
66. See generally Goodman, supra note 57; Kopple & Veenhuis, supra note 9; Wangard,
supra note 9.
67. I.R.C. § 402(e)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
68. I.R.C. § 402(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
69. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). See also Chadwick, supra note 6, at 564-65.
70. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2), (e)(1)(c) (Supp. flI 1979). In determining the tax on the ordinary
income portion (i.e., post-1973), an "initial separate tax" is imposed if timely election is
made. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(B) (1976). If elected, the ordinary income portion is taxed as if it
were the only income received by the individual. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
348, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5128. Consequently, all other income
realized in the year of the qualified plan distribution will have no effect on the tax imposed
on the lump-sum distribution. This method of taxation, referred to as the separate basket
approach, is intended to eliminate differences in the tax treatment of individuals caused by
the presence or absence of other income in the distribution year. The tax on the ordinary
income portion, referred to in I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(A) (1976) as the initial separate tax, is equal
to ten times the tax for unmarried individuals on 1/10th of the "total taxable amount" in
excess of the "minimum distribution allowance." I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979). (The
tax rate table for unmarried individuals is used in calculating the tax on the ordinary income
portion of a lump-sum distribution regardless of the schedule the recipient uses in calculating
the tax on his other income). In effect, the above procedure simulates the tax that would
result if the lump-sum payment were received in equal installments over the remainder of
the recipient's life. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 151, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. S-AD. Nnws 4670, 4815. In determining the tax on the averageable portion of the
distribution, the total taxable amount must be multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the number of calendar years of active post-1973 participation in the plan and the
denominator of which is the employee's total years of active participation.
After determining the tax on the ordinary income portion, computing the tax on the
capital gains portion is relatively simple. First, the total taxable amount must be multiplied
by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of pre-1974 years of active plan participation and the denominator of which is the employee's total years of active participation.
Second, the capital gains portion is then taxed as either capital gains or regular averaging
under I.R.C. § 1301. No election is necessary for capital gains treatment. Additionally, the
"separate basket approach" does not extend to capital gains treatment. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(2)
(Supp. 1I 1979). See also Chadwick, supranote 6, at 569.
71. See Chadwick, supranote 6, at 567-68.
72. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. S
An. NEws 4670, 4815. See generally Schmitt, The Pension Reform Act of 1974 and the Self
Employed Person, 68 ILL. B.J. 512 (1975).
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ERISA also introduced the concept of "rollover amounts." 73 The rollover
provisions allow an employee to transfer his benefits, tax-free, from one qualified plan to another, or from a qualified plan to an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA).74 The qualified plan benefits that are rolled over must be received in a lump-sum distribution and must be transferred to an IRA or a
qualified plan within sixty days of receipt. 5
The enactment of the rollover provisions reflected congressional recognition
of the high incidence of employee turnover in the American economy.7 6 Congress acted to insure that as long as distributions from employee retirement
plans were retained for retirement purposes, they would receive favorable tax
treatment.7 7 Although a tax-free transfer was possible under prior law, the
complexity involved impeded such transactions.7 8 ERISA thus simplified the
tax treatment of lump-sum distributions and met the congressional objective
of preventing the discriminatory use of qualified plans for executive level
employees only.79
73. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA § 311(b)(3)(A)).
74. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA § 311(b)(l)(A)). See also
Mezzullo, supra note 7, at 251.
75. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(D) (Supp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA § 311(b)(3)(A)).
76. See Mezzullo, supra note 7, at 251.
77. Id.
78. Prior to ERISA, a nontaxable rollover of sorts was recognized by the Internal Revenue
Service, but only if participants received a distribution upon discontinuance of their qualified
plan and then paid it over to the trustees of a new qualified plan. See Rev. Rul. 213, 1967-2
C.B. 149; Rev. Rul. 368, 1955-1 C.B. 40. See also Mezzullo, supra note 7, at 251; Note, Qualified
Plan Distributions:Tax Deferral, ERISA and the IRA, 45 FoRD L. REv. 389, 402 (1976).
79. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(4) (1976) which provides in part: "A trust . . .forming part of a
... plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees . . . shall constitute a
qualified trust under this section .... (4) if the contributions or benefits under the plan do
not discriminate in favor of employees who are .. . (A) officers, (b) shareholders, or (C) highly
compensated." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 222, 232.
Cases have interpreted the I.R.C. § 401 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) qualification requirements
for allocation, see, e.g., Auner v. United States, 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971) (profit-sharing
plan allocating contributions based on seniority, training and experience held discriminatory);
Charles E. Smith 8c Sons, Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 953 (1951) (profit-sharing plan held discriminatory where almost one-half of contributions were allocated for the benefit of the president and sole shareholder); Gold Seal Prods.
Co. v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f19747 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (comparing sponsored
profit-sharing plan containing a years-of-service factor in its allocation formula held not discriminatory); Quality Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 167 (1976) (reallocation of
forfeited benefits solely on the basis of total participation in the plan is discriminatory);
Robertson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 727 (1974) (allocation based in part on the shareholder
employees' respective shares of a corporation's taxable income is discriminatory); coverage,
see, e.g., Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977) (profit-sharing plan held discriminatory when plan was operated so that contributions were allocated only for the benefit
of the sole shareholder and even though five additional employees were eligible); Container
Serv. Co. v. United States, 478 F.2d 770 (6th Cir. 1973) (profit-sharing plan covering five
employees, four of whom were officers and supervisors, held discriminatory); Loevsky v.
Commissioner, 471 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973) (profit-sharing plan
of Subchapter S corporation held discriminatory when only 10% of the regular, full time
work force was covered, while all officers, shareholders, and supervisors were covered); CornellYoung Co. v. United States, 469 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1972) (profit-sharing plan held dis-
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criminatory where only 12 of 163 employees were covered); Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagra
Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1968), reaJg 48 T.C. 75 (1967) (profit-sharing plan held
discriminatory because it favored salaried employees over hourly employees); John Duquid 8Sons, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1967) (pension plan covering only
president, vice-president, and supervisor held discriminatory); Wisconsin Nipple & Fabricating
Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 490 (1976) (profit-sharing plan held discriminatory because 5
of the 6 employees covered were highly compensated); Babst Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 131 (1976) (eligibility requirements of a profit-sharing plan held to discriminate in
favor of officers, shareholders, and highly compensated employees); Liberty Mach. Works, Inc.,
62 T.C. 621 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 518 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1975) (profit-sharing plan covering a shareholder-officer and a plant superintendent held discriminatory); Bernard McManamy,
Contractor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1057 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 359 (1971)
(a proportionately greater allocation of employer contributions to a sole stockholder and
executive officer than to other participants held discriminatory); Loper Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 385 (1969) (profit-sharing plan covering the two sole shareholders
held discriminatory); Ed &Jim Fleitz, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 384 (1968) (profit-sharing
plan with a "salaried only" classification covering three highly compensated employees held
discriminatory); Peter F. Mitchell Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCI) 1030 (1968),
supplemented by, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 425 (1969) (profit-sharing plan covering three highly
compensated employees held discriminatory); Ray Cleaners, Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 23 (1968) (profit-sharing plan containing restrictions as to minimum length of service,
part-time employees, and age held non-discriminatory); Ryan School Retirement Trust v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 127 (1955) (profit-sharing plan covering five officers, three rank & file
employees, and two other employees held not discriminatory; definition of employee, see, e.g.,
Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977) (office personnel of a professional corporation
are employees for purposes of the coverage requirements of § 401); Jim's Window Serv. Inc. v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 563 (1974) (clerical workers are employees for purposes of
§ 401); definition of supervisor, see, e.g., Birnie v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 867, 871
(1953) (a supervisor is one whose principal duties consist of supervising the work of other
employees); discrimination, see, e.g., Quality Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 163, 172-73
(1976) (discrimination occurs when amounts allocated to a prohibited group are disproportionately higher than the amounts allocated to other employees); Stockvis v. Commissioner, 10
T.C.M. (CCH) 74, 80 (1951) (pension trust established and operated for the exclusive benefit
of every employee completing one year held not discriminatory); Volckening, Inc. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 723 (1949) (profit-sharing plan basing contributions on a uniform relation
to the regular rate of compensation held not discriminatory); integration, see, e.g., Simmons
v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCI-) f19583 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (pension plan held
disqualified because death benefits provided through life insurance were not incidental and
discriminated by failing to meet requirements of integration with social security benefits);
loans, notes, trusts, see, e.g., Central Motor Co. v. United States, 76-I U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH)
9245 (D.N.M. 1976) (pension plan disqualified because contributions were invested in inadequately secured demand of the employer); Advance Constr. Corp. v. United States, 356
F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (secured, interest bearing note held a proper form of contribution); Lansing v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (1976) (trust established in conjunction with a qualified pension plan was held to lack sufficient economic reality to be recognized
for tax purposes); Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 326 (1971), aft'd, 492 F.2d 1018 (9th
Cir. 1974) (lump-sum distribution held taxable as ordinary income because pension plan not
properly funded); past service, see, e.g., Sherman Constr. Corp. v. United States, 358 F. Supp.
446 (E.D. Va. 1973) (profit-sharing plan allowing sole shareholder five years credit for the
years the business was a sole proprietorship did not disqualify plan); vesting, see, e.g., United
States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968) (partnership with two profit-sharing plans providing different vesting provisions for partners and employees is not per se discriminatory).
See generally Arch, Employee Plans v. The Fine Line Between Permitted and Prohibited
Discrimination,8 TAx AnvisER 644 (1977); Sanchez, Cain, & Wood, The Pension Reform Act
of 1974: Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions, 6 TAx AnvsEs
86 (1975);
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It is apparent that Congress envisioned distributions from two entirely different types of retirement plans: qualified plans, which are eligible for favorable tax treatment,8 0 and nonqualified plans, which receive no special tax treatment.8 1 It is likewise apparent that Congress's overriding objective is securing
and solidifying favorable tax treatment for the retirement benefits of the rankand-file employee. Finally, it is clear that Congress, through ERISA, sought
computational simplicity in the treatment of lump-sum distributions. s °- The
legislative history, however, does not reveal how Congress intended to treat
distributions from nonqualified plans that were formerly qualified.8 3 The construction of the statute itself implies two separate and distinct classifications
of retirement plans5 4 It is unclear whether disqualification, which is merely the
loss of favorable tax status, converts assets that accumulated while the plan
was qualified into nonqualified assets for purposes of lump-sum treatment.
Determining the appropriate tax treatment of distributions from formerly
qualified plans has thus fallen on the judiciary.85
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Greenwald v. Commissioner,"" decided prior to ERISA,11 was the first case
to address the treatment of a lump-sum distribution from a disqualified plan.
In Greenwald, the taxpayer, an employee of Interstate Hosiery Mill, Inc.,
participated in a qualified plan established by his employer in May, 1945.8 In
1953, when Interstate's assets were acquired by another company, fifty-nine of
the sixty plan participants terminated their employment 8 9 Upon termination,
these employees received their benefits in a lump-sum distribution from the
plan. 90 Mr. Greenwald, however, remained with the company as a participant
in the plan. When the other fifty-nine participants received their full distribu-

Sanchez 9- Cain, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Participation Requirements, 6 TAx
VISER

AD-

397 (1975).

80. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979), (e)(4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA
§ 311(b)(2), (c)(2)).
81. I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976).
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. See Stogel & Ervin, supra note 11, at 594-96.
84. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1976 8: Supp. III 1979 as amended by ERTA §§ 311, 314) (applicable to qualified plans) & (b) (1976) (applicable to nonqualified plans).
85. See infra note 86 & 118 and accompanying text.
86. 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'g in part & rev'g in part 44 T.C. 137 (1965).
87. Although decided prior to ERISA, the ambiguity addressed by Greenwald was not
clarified by the 1974 Act. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
88. 366 F.2d at 539. Mr. Greenwald was one of Interstate Hosiery's principal officers, but
was only a minority stockholder of the company. In 1945, Interstate Hosiery established a
profit-sharing trust called "The Madison Trust." The Commissioner approved the plan on
May 23, 1945.Id.
89. Interstate Hosiery negotiated an agreement with Burlington Mills, dated December 9,
1953, under which Green Cove Hosiery Corp., a subsidiary of Burlington Mills formed for the
purpose of buying the assets of Interstate, agreed to buy all of Interstate's assets. Id.
90. Due to the changes in the nature of Interstate's business, the Tax Court held that the
trust was no longer exempt. 44 T.C. at 148.
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tion from the plan, Mr. Greenwald had $90,281.08 credited to his account.91
No contributions were made to the plan from 1954 to 1959, the year of his
termination.92 In 1959, Mr. Greenwald received a lump-sum distribution of
$168,922.55, which he reported as capital gains on his 1959 income tax return. 93
Before both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit the Commissioner
argued that since the plan was disqualified, the distribution should be treated
as if it were from a nonqualified plan.9 4 The Second Circuit reversed the Tax
Court in holding that the amount in Greenwald's account as of 1954 should
receive capital gains treatment. 95 The circuit court noted that the fifty-nine
other employees had probably received capital gains treatment, 9 and it would
therefore be harsh to treat Mr. Greenwald differntly because he continued
with the employer after its business transformation. The court further noted
that the applicable statute, I.R.C. § 402(a)(2), does not support such an inequity. 7 Neither the statute nor its underlying policy justified treating the
portion of the benefits that accumulated while the trust was qualified as a
distribution from a nonqualified trust.98 The court concluded that this decision was consistent with the statute's purpose of affording capital gains treatment to qualified plans as long as they remain qualified. 99 This interpretation
is reasonable since section 402(b) envisions a year-by-year determination of
100
whether or not a trust is exempt.
The issue of proper tax treatment of distributions from nonqualified plans
that were formerly qualified was next addressed in Pitt v. United States.'01 The
91. 366 F.2dat 539.
92. From 1954 to 1959, I.H.L. (Interstate's new name) engaged in the investment business,
purchasing a considerable number of its own shares. Consequently, 97% of the outstanding
shares were controlled by Harold Greenwald or members of his immediate family on January
1, 1959. During these years, no contributions were made by I.H.L. to the profit-sharing trust.
Additionally, the taxpayer was the only participating employee in the trust. Id.
93. 366 F.2d at 540. I.H.L. entered a reorganization agreement with Fundamental Investors, Inc. on July 51, 1959. Under the agreement, Fundamental agreed to acquire the assets
of I.H.L. in exchange for Fundamental's stock. After consumation of the transaction on
October 1, 1959, I.H.L. distributed the stock to its shareholders and was dissolved. The
Madison Trust received 14,640 shares of Fundamental stock. These shares, along with
$31,266.83 in cash, were transferred to the taxpayer in November 1959, who then reported
the value of the distribution, $168,922.55, as long-term capital gain. The taxpayer maintained that the distribution was from a tax-exempt profit-sharing employee trust. Id.
94. Id. at 541. Distributions from a nonqualified trust are taxed as ordinary income.
I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976).
95. 366 F.2d at 541. The court reasoned that the remainder of the 1959 distribution was
not entitled to capital gains treatment because it was from a discriminatory trust. Therefore,
this portion was properly includable in the taxpayer's 1959 income at ordinary income rates.
Id.
96. Id.

97.
98.
plan.
99.
100.
101.
Florida

Id.
Id. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976) for the treatment of a distribution from a nonqualfied
866 F.2d at 541.
Id.
75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) II 9472 (M.D. Fla. 1975). George Pitt was employed by
Machine Products as an officer and supervisor, but was not a stockholder. Id.
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plan in Pitt was qualified at its inception in 1959, but disqualified in 1969.102
In 1970, the taxpayer received a lump-sum distribution from the plan, which
he reported on his 1970 income tax return as capital gain.10 3 The Service disallowed capital gain treatment under section 402(a)(2),104 taking the position
that the entire distribution should be taxed at ordinary income rates because
it was received from a disqualified plan. 05 The taxpayer, however, claimed
that only contributions after disqualification were subject to ordinary rates. 06
The federal district court, relying on Greenwald, held that contributions to the
trust while it was qualified were entitled to capital gains treatment, and only
the balance was subject to ordinary rates. 107
In 1980, the issue was brought before the Tax Court in Woodson v. Commissioner.'°s In Woodson, the plan in question was a qualified plan from 1966
through 1973, when the IRS revoked its qualified status. 0 9 The plan, therefore, had an eight year life and was qualified for seven of those eight years.' 10
In 1974, the taxpayer received a lump-sum distribution of $25,485.98, of which
$2,643.39 was attributable to contributions made after exempt status was revoked." 1
The Tax Court, relying on the Second Circuit's position in Greenwald, held
that the amount accumulated prior to disqualification, and the earnings on
those benefits while the plan was not qualified, were entitled to capital gains
treatment.11 2 Although relying on Greenwald, the Tax Court went beyond it
by allowing lump-sum treatment both for amounts accumulated at the time of
disqualification" 3 and for amounts earned after disqualification but attributable
102. Id. The plan was disqualified because of an unsecured loan made from the plan to
the company. In a determination letter dated September 29, 1969, the exempt status of the
plan was revoked for the taxable year beginning December 1, 1969. The Service determined
the loan constituted a "prohibited transaction" under I.R.C. § 503(b)(1) (1976). Id. See supra
note 81 for a listing of loans made by exempt trusts.
103. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) fT9472. Pitt received a distribution from the company
retirement plan upon terminating his employment with the company. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The taxpayer sought to use the Greenwald approach in response to the Service's
position. Id.
107. Id. The court expressly adopted the Greenwald rationale in granting summary
judgment to the taxpayer. Id.
108. 73 T.C. 779 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
109. 73 T.C. at 780. The retirement plan, which was in the form of a profit-sharing trust,
was qualified from 1966 until April 1, 1973, the date exempt status was revoked. The Service's
revocation letter, dated July 30, 1975, stated in part: "In view of the fact that benefits were
forfeited on partial termination of the plan and funds were diverted to purposes other than
for the exclusive benefit of the participants, our determination letters referred to above are
hereby revoked, effective April 1, 1973." Id. at 781.
110. See supra note 108.
111. 73 T.C. at 781-82. The total distribution from the trust was $30,052.81. The employees' contributions of $4,566.83 were subtracted from this amount yielding a lump-sum
distribution of $25,485.98. Id. at 780.
112. 73 T.C. at 786. The court expressly concluded that the portion of the distribution
attributable to contributions made prior to disqualification "should be treated as a distribution
from a qualified trust exempt from tax under section 501(a)." Id.
113. Id. In the words of dissent: "In the instant case, the majority appears to provide
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to the balance at the date of disqualification."1 This effectively allowed the
retirement plan to continue as if partially qualified after its qualified status
was revoked. 11 The court focused on the fact that there was nothing in the
Code that precluded this approach. 18 Moreover, the court noted that an all-or7
nothing approach would create inequitable treatment of taxpayers."3
The three-judge dissent in Woodson argued this treatment was impermissible under the Code."18 The dissent took the position that section 402 limits
lump-sum treatment to distributions coming from a trust that is presently
qualified." 0o In an effort to distinguish Greenwald, the dissent noted that although Congress had twice changed the treatment of lump-sum distributions
since the Greenwald decision, it had not indicated agreement with the Greenwald approach 20 The dissent decried the majority's extension of the Greenwald approach to earnings accumulated after disqualification, but attributable
to contributions made while the trust was exempt.'2 ' The dissent also complained that the majority gave no indication of how to implement its rule in
the case of a defined benefit plan 22 and no explanation for its deviation from
Greenwald.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that distributions from dis-

favored tax treatment to some part of the earnings after the trust lost its exempt status. The
majority offers no explanation for this deviation from the Greenwald rule nor guidance for
the next case." Id. at 791 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 786. Whether the majority actually intended to deviate from the Greenwald
rule is unclear. However, the plain meaning of the words "attributable to" requires this
conclusion.
115. Assuming that the balance in the employee's account at disqualification continues
to produce earnings, e.g., interest, thereafter, these amounts are attributable to contributions
made when the plan was qualified. If these subsequent earnings are given lump-sum treatment, the plan continues to be qualified.
116. 73 T.C. at 784. The court reasoned that the mere loss of an exemption should not
convert "qualified assets in an exempt trust to nonqualified assets in a nonexempt trust. To
hold otherwise would create a rule-of-law that would penalize the innocent employee who
had no say in the management of the trust and retroactively change the ground rules that he
could fairly have anticipated would govern the taxability of payments to him." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 787 (Chabot, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that since the trust from
which the distributions in the instant case were made was not exempt at the time of distribution, section 402(b) should control its taxation. This argument was based on the assertion that section 402(b) provides ordinary income treatment for distributions from nonexempt
trusts. Id. However, section 402(b) states: "Contributions to an employees' trust made by the
employer during a taxable year . .. for which the trust is not exempt ... shall be included
in the gross income of the employee .... The amount actually distributed ... by any such

trust shall be taxable to him in the year in which so distributed .... " I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976).
Thus, the distributions treated by section 402(b) are based on contributions to a trust that is
nonexempt, regardless of the trust's status at the time of distribution.
119. 78 T.C. at 787.
120. Id. at 788.
121. Id. at 791. See supranote 117.
122. 73 T.C. at 791. Although applying the Greenwald solution to the defined benefit plan
may prove administratively difficult, the amount standing to the employee's credit at the date
of his qualification can be calculated.
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qualified plans were not entitled to favorable tax treatment. 123 The court
reasoned that to uphold the Tax Court's decision strained the language of
section 402(a).1 4 The court added, in a footnote, that while the Second Circuit
resolves statutory ambiguities in favor of the taxpayer, the Fifth Circuit does
not.y5 The court also expressed reluctance to abrogate a Treasury Regulation
it considered on point.126 The Tax Court may thus no longer follow its Woodson position in the Fifth Circuit, although the reversal in Woodson does not
control the Tax Court's position on this issue in other circuits.
After the Woodson decision by the Tax Court, but prior to its appeal to
the Fifth Circuit, the Greenwald approach was followed in Hesse v. United
States.127 In Hesse, the taxpayer was a participant in a qualified plan estab123. 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
124. The "is exempt" language of § 402(a) would hate to be read as "was exempt." Id.
at 1095. The court maintained that the only support for the Tax Court's ruling was a policy
to extend capital gains treatment eminating, anomalously, from a statute that itself provides
for gradual elimination of all capital gains treatment of employee trust distributions. The
court concluded that if capital gains treatment was to be further extended, Congress should
do it. Id. at 1095-96.
125. Id. at 1095 n.3 (citing United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964)). In
United States v. Johnson, the court held that ambiguities in the context of employee trusts
should be resolved against the taxpayer. For a discussion of the appropriateness of this rule
of construction, see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
The court further argued that Greenwald was decided before Congress enacted ERISA,
which added § 402(e)(4). 651 F.2d at 1095 n.3. Section 402(e)(4)(A) defines a lump-sum distribution as "the distribution or payment within one taxable year ... from a trust which forms a
part of a plan described in section 401(a) and which is exempt from tax under section
501.
... I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (1976). The court, based on a literal reading of the statute
concluded that the phrase "which is exempt from tax under section 501" required that a
trust be exempt at the time of distribution. 651 F.2d at 1096. The real issue, however, is
whether Congress intended this phrase to specify the time at which a trust must be exempt,
or whether this phrase was merely intended to identify the category of trusts, i.e., exempt or
nonexempt, entitled to lump-sum treatment.
126. 651 F.2d at 1096. The court cited Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii), T.D. 6823, 1965-1
C.B. 176, 177, which contains the following language: "The provisions of section 402(a) relate
only to a distribution by a trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt under section
501(a) for the taxable year in which the distribution is made."
The language of this regulation is clearly contrary to the Greenwald approach, which
allows the bifurcation of a lump-sum distribution into qualified and nonqualified portions.
The United States Supreme Court, however, stated in Estate of Sanford v. United States, 308
U.S. 39, 51 (1939), that one of the criteria in evaluating a regulation is whether it is fair to
both the taxpayer and the government. The approach espoused by this regulation is blatantly
unfair to the innocent employee, who is also the taxpayer. The district court in Hesse v.
United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f19153 (E.D. Mo. 1981), concluded that this approach "leaves the government with all the aces." Id. It has also been stated that legislative
regulations should be overturned if they exceed the scope of the statute, contradict the statute,
or are unreasonable. See Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity- A View From Within, 43 TAxas 756, 759 (1959). These are grounds for arguing that
the regulation exceeds the scope of the statute. The regulation is clearly unreasonable, however, in light of the congressional intent to protect the innocent employee. See supra note 45.
Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) (1965) should therefore not be controlling as to the issue of
whether or not lump-sum treatment should be extended to distributions from disqualified
plans.
127. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ff 9153 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
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lished in 1967. In 1972, the taxpayer's employer found it necessary to reduce
its work force. The IRS revoked the plan's qualification April 1, 1972.1a In
September 1975 the plan was terminated, and the taxpayer received a lumpsum distribution of plan benefits. 29 Thereafter, the taxpayer placed the amount
of the distribution in an IRA. The IRS, however, taxed the distribution as
ordinary income and denied the taxpayer's subsequent claim for a refund.18 0
Consequently, the taxpayer brought an action for a refund in federal district
court.' 8 '
The court, in granting the refund, held that disqualification of the plan did
not convert tax-exempt assets into non-exempt assets. 32 Moreover, the court
reasoned that disallowance of capital gains treatment would penalize the innocent employee for disqualification of the plan, which was beyond his control. 8 Finally, the court expressed its agreement with the rationale used in
Greenwald, Pitt, and Woodson.8 4 Thus, the amount standing to the taxpayer's
credit as of the date of disqualification was treated as a distribution from a
qualified plan. 85

Lum-SuM DISTRIBUTIONS AND SECTION 402
The conflicting results reached in Greenwald and Woodson demonstrate
the varying interpretations to which I.R.C. § 402 is susceptible 8 6 The appropriate treatment of lump-sum distributions from disqualified plans should
be based on congressional purpose.13r The relevant statutory language must
therefore be carefully analyzed to determine this congressional intent.
Section 402(a)(2), which provides capital gains treatment for lump-sum distributions from exempt trusts, is expressly applicable to any trust "which is
exempt from tax under section 501(a)."' 38 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether
"is exempt" refers to the time of contribution or the time of distribution. s9
128. Id. Paulo's plan covered certain salaried employees, including Alvin Hesse. The reduction of the work force consisted of salaried employees. Paulo made contributions to the
plan on behalf of Hesse for fiscal years beginning in 1966 through 1974. However, the contributions made on Hesse's behalf for fiscal years 1972, 1973, and 1974 were taxable to him as
ordinary income, even though not distributed in those years. Id.
129. Id. $4,252 of this distribution was based on contributions made prior to disqualification. Id.
130. Id. Hesse claimed a refund of $1,553 based upon tax on taxable income of $4,252.
Hesse's claim was disallowed by Statutory Notice of Claim Disallowance on January 5, 1978.

Id.
131. Id.

132. Id. The court found no cases addressing rollovers from disqualified plans under section 402(a)(5) (1976), concluding that this case was one of first impression. However, the court
cited Greenwald, Pitt, and the Tax Court decision in Woodson, and found the rationale of

these cases applicable to section 402(a)(5). Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135.

81-1 US. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 1f9153.

136. See Appendix for relevant portions of § 402.
137. See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385

U.S. 1005 (1967).
138. See supra note 136.

139. See supranote 125.
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If the statute is construed as requiring only that a trust be exempt at the time
of contribution, then lump-sum distributions should be accorded capital gains
treatment in proportion to the time period the trust was exempt. Conversely,
if the statute is construed as referring to the time of distribution, then lumpsum distributions from disqualified plans should never receive capital gains
treatment.
Section 402(e)(4), added by ERISA in 1974, limits the scope of its applicability to a lump-sum distribution from a trust which "is exempt from tax under
section 501."140 Once again, however, the words "is exempt" are unqualified as
to the time period to which they refer.141 Furthermore, the legislative history
contains no indication that Congress contemplated a relevant time period to
qualify the phrase. 142 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended
this statutory language merely to identify the type of trust for which special
treatment was available.
Section 402(a), which generally provides for the taxation of beneficiaries of
exempt trusts, is paralleled by section 402(b), which provides for the taxation
of beneficiaries of nonexempt trusts. 43 The distributions to which section
402(b) applies are, according to the express language of the statute, based on
contributions made to a nonexempt trust, regardless of the trust's status at the
time of distribution.14 Consequently, if a nonexempt trust becomes qualified
in a later year, the amounts contributed in the earlier years should be treated
at distribution as if they came from a nonexempt trust. 145 Conversely, if an
exempt trust is disqualified in a later year, the amounts contributed prior to
disqualification would be treated at distribution as if they came from an exempt trust. It is clear that Congress intended subsection (b) to designate the
treatment of any trust that is not exempt at the time of contribution.146 It
therefore follows that Congress expected subsection (a) to provide the treatment for trusts that are exempt when contributions are made, assuming that
this status would continue until distribution. This conclusion is supported by
the absence of a provision in either of these subsections for a trust that does not
maintain its initial status.147 Hence, the assertion of the district court in Hesse
that Congress did not provide for a distribution from a qualified plan that is
4
subsequently disqualified seems well-founded.1 8
Section 402(b) focuses, however, on the status of the trust at the time of
contribution. 149 Moreover, if a nonexempt trust becomes exempt, subsection

140. See supranote 136.
141. See supra note 125.
142. See infra text accompanying note 140.
143. See supra note 136. See also Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 783 (1980),
rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
144. See supra notes 118 & 136.
145. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 785 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1095 (5th
Cir. 1981).
146. Id.
147. See supra note 43.
148. See Hesse v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ff9153 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
149. See supra note 113.
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(b) no longer applies.'50 Instead, subsection (a) would apply, but only for
contributions made after exempt status was obtained. 51 Obtaining exempt
status would therefore not change the character of contributions made while
the trust was nonexempt. In a subsequent lump-sum distribution, the trust
52
assets would be split into exempt and nonexempt portions.
The Internal Revenue Service has adopted this approach to the requalification of disqualified plans in Revenue Ruling 73-79.153 This ruling deals with

a retirement plan that had been disqualified, but was amended by the employer
in the following year to reestablish exempt status. 5 4 While granting requalification, the ruling made it clear that nonqualified assets could remain in the
trust. 55 The accounting for these assets, therefore, must necessarily be separate
from that of the qualified assets. 50 This segregation of assets would result in
the splitting of a subsequent lump-sum distribution into qualified and nonqualified portions.
In the converse situation, the loss of exempt status should not change the
character of contributions made while the trust was exempt. Analogizing this
situation to the Revenue Ruling, a subsequent lump-sum distribution should
thus be split into exempt and nonexempt portions. This symmetrical con57
struction of subsections (a) and (b) will produce fair and consistent results'
Furthermore, this construction is in harmony with the Supreme Court's
proclamation in Commissioner v. Lester that "the Code must be given an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit." 58
The conclusion that assets contributed to qualified plans should retain their
qualified nature is strengthened by the longstanding treatment of excess contributions to qualified plans. Since 1961, Treasury Regulation section 1.404(a)
has limited the annual deduction an employer can take for contributions to
a qualified plan. 59 Contributions in excess of this limit, however, are deductible in the following year under I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A), even if the trust is not
exempt in that year. 60 Thus, the availability of the deduction in a subsequent
year is determined by the status of the trust at the time of contribution. In
150. The express language of I.R.C. § 402(b) (1976) renders it applicable only to distributions based on contributions made to a nonexempt trust.
151. . See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
152. See Stogel &Ervin, supra note 11, at 596.
153. 1973-1 C.B. 194. See generally Furseth, Retroactive Cure of Employee Plan Defects:
When, What, and How, 48 J. TAX'N 220 (1978).
154. Rev. Rul. 79, 1973-1 C.B. 194.

155. Id.
156. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 785 (1980). See also Simmons, Dangers
of Disqualificationof QualifiedPlans,33 INsr. ON FE. TAx'N 507, 540 (1975).
See Westin, Dubious InterpretativeRules for Construing Federal Taxing Statutes, 17
RLv. 1, 6 (1981).
158. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 291, 804 (1966) (quoting United States v. Olympic
Radio &Television, 349 U.S. 232,236 (1955)).
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-9(a), (b), (e) (1956). See generally Foight & Glassberg, ERISA:
Impact of the New Limitations on Benefits and Contributions, 6 TAx ADVISER 539 (1975);
Weil, ERISA Limitations on Contributions and Benefits for Qualified Profit-Sharing and
Pension Plans,34 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 169 (1976) (ERISA Supp.).
160. See Treas. Reg. § 1A04(a)-9(a), (b), (e) (1956).
157.

WAxE FoRrr L.
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addition, section 501 provides exempt status for twenty-two listed organizations,
61
including the employee's trust described in section 402(a). For purposes of
characterizing contributions to these organizations, the status of the organiza162
This approach is consistent
tion at the time of contribution is conclusive.
it affords special tax treatsince
402(a),
section
of
purpose
underlying
the
with
16 3
the language
Furthermore,
exempt.
remains
trust
the
as
ment only so long
whether an
of
determination
a
year-by-year
envisions
which
of section 402(b),
8 4
result.
this
supports
exempt,
is
trust
employee
The resolution of any ambiguity in a Code provision should ultimately be
based on congressional purpose.' 86 Therefore, even though symmetry has been
868
it cannot conreferred to as the "handmaiden of equity and good sense,"'
Congressional
statute.
particular
stitute the sole basis for the construction of a
intent must also be examined.
From the Revenue Act cf 1921 through ERISA, Congress has based its retirement plan legislation on one overriding goal: protection and preservation
of special tax benefits for the retirement plans of ordinary employees. In the
post-war era of 1921, special tax benefits were enacted to provide incentives for
the creation of employee retirement plans. 167 When this congressional objective
was circumvented, Congress, through the Revenue Act of 1942, sought to insure
86
In 1974, ERISA was enacted
the protection of the rank-and-file employee.
for the dual purposes of simplifying the treatment of lump-sum distributions
and providing fairer laws for retirement plans."' The Tax Court, therefore,
recognized in Woodson that it was the avowed purpose of Congress to aid tax0
payers in preparing for their own retirement."7 Thus, despite the ambiguities
of section 402, Congress has clearly expressed its purpose to protect and benefit
the employee.
AN

ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS

The cases which have addressed the problem of tax treatment for lump-sum
distributions from disqualified plans have established three potential solutions.
First, the Second Circuit in Greenwald solved the problem by splitting the
7
lump-sum distribution into qualified and nonqualified portions.' ' The Tax
Court's modified Greenwald rule is a second solution to the ambiguity of secI.R.C. § 501(c) (1976 &Supp. IV 1980).
See MERTENS, L'W OF FEDERAL INCOME
ed. and 1981 cum. supp.).
161.

162.

163.

TAXATION - CODE COMMENTARY,

§ 501

(1978

See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 538,541 (1966).

164. Id.
165. See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967).
166. See Westin, supra note 149, at 6.
167. See Goodfellow, supra note 6, at 204.
168. Id.
169. See Arntson, Still Short of Its Goal: A Critical Look at Individual Retirement Accounts, 34 WAsH. &LEE L. REV. 85, 93 (1977); Chadwick, supra note 6, at 559.
170. Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 784 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1981).
171. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 541. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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tion 402.172 The Fifth Circuit's all-or-nothing approach in Woodson is a third
solution. 73
The mechanics of the Greenwald approach are simple: the characterization
of trust assets is determined by the status of the trust at the time of contribution.Y74 Consequently, a lump-sum distribution from a disqualified trust would
be split into qualified and nonqualified portions. The net effect of this approach is that the amount in the trust standing to the employee's credit at the
date of disqualification is entitled to lump-sum treatment. Accordingly, contributions made after disqualification would be taxed as ordinary income under
section 402(b).
The Greenwald solution protects the interest of the employee/taxpayer. In
this respect, it is clearly supported by longstanding congressional purpose in
the area of employee retirement benefits.' 7 5 Furthermore, the Greenwald approach is based on a symmetrical construction of subsections (a) and (b) of
section 402, and thus provides functional consistency within the section. 7 6
Moreover, since section 402(b) envisions a year-by-year determination of
whether a trust is exempt, allowing the benefits of qualification to attach on a
77
year-by-year basis comports with the practicalities of the statute.
Finally, the Creenwald approach is supported by the fact that Congress has
twice enacted legislation affecting lump-sum treatment since the Greenwald
decision was rendered, yet the legislature has failed to address the ambiguity
in section 402.178 Under the reenactment doctrine, judicial interpretations of
legislation are implicitly validated when Congress reenacts that legislation." 79
In Hartley v. Commissioner280 the Supreme Court indicated that the doctrine
of reenactment should be applied by the courts if Congress reenacts a statute
without material change.18 ' Congress perpetuated the ambiguity Greenwald
addressed by reenacting section 402 without material change. 8 2 Therefore, the
Greenwald solution has received implicit congressional approval under the
reenactment doctrine.
In Woodson, the Tax Court set forth another potential solution to the
problem of lump-sum distributions from disqualified plans. 1 3 The Tax Court
went beyond Greenwald'84 and allowed earnings accrued after disqualification
to receive capital gains treatment if they were attributable to contributions
made while the plan was qualified. 8 5 By allowing a disqualified plan to con172. Woodson, 73 T.C. at 786. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
173. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1095, n.3. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
174. 366 F.2d at 541.
175. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 148-145.
177. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (1966).
178. Since 1966, Congress has enacted the Tax Reform Act in 1969, ERISA in 1974, and
ERTA in 1981.
179. See Westin, supra note 157, at 2.
180. 295 U.S. 216 (1935).
181. Id. at220.
182. See supra note 120.

183. Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
184. 73 T.C. at 786.
185. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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tinue as if partially qualified, the purpose of qualification requirements is
defeated.S6 Furthermore, the Tax Court's solution is computationally complex,18 7 and therefore contradicts one of the congressional objectives in
ERISA.1ss
The all-or-nothing approach 89 the Fifth Circuit took in Woodson permits
lump-sum treatment only if a plan is qualified on the day of distribution. 190
The inherent problem with this solution is its gross unfairness to the employee.' 91 Under this approach, the recipient of a lump-sum distribution would
be taxed on the entire distribution, which may result from years' accumulations, in a single tax year.", 2 Consequently, this rule of law penalizes the in93
nocent employee who had no control over the management of the trust.
The inequities of the Fifth Circuit approach to the innocent employee
94
clearly render it inconsistent with longstanding congressional purpose.
Furthermore, the income-bunching problem dealt with by Congress in the
Revenue Act of 1942 would continue to plague the taxpayer under this rule of
law. 95 Finally, in enunciating the Woodson opinion, the Fifth Circuit was untroubled by the ambiguity of section 402, which was addressed by the Second
Circuit, the Tax Court, and two district courts.196 In a footnote to its opinion,
the court acknowledged this ambiguity but refused to resolve it in favor of the
employee. 9 7 This decision is contrary to the rule of tax statute construction
that ambiguities in tax laws are resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against
the government. 9 8 This rule seems particularly compelling when, as here, both
the underlying equities and clearly expressed congressional purpose favor the
taxpayer.
CONCLUSION

The approach of the Second Circuit in Greenwald, which allows capital
gains treatment for contributions made while the plan is qualified, is undoubtedly the most reasonable solution. In an era in which a large number of

186. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
187. 73 T.C. at 791.
188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
189. The Fifth Circuit borrowed the phrase "all-or-nothing" from the Tax Court's opinion
in Woodson: "We refuse to take an all or nothing approach. We have found no congressional
mandate requiring such an approach. Absent such a mandate, we refuse to adopt a rule of
law that would cause such inequities." Id. (using language from Woodson v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. at 784).
190. 651 F.2d at 1096. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
191. 73 T.C. at 784.
192. Id. at 783.
193. Id. at 784.
194. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
196. 651 F.2d at 1096.
197. Id. at 1095, n.3.
198. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRucTION § 66.01, at 179 (4th ed.
1974).
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Americans are reaching retirement age,9 9 policy notions supporting beneficial
tax treatment for the rank-and-file employee are greatly enhanced. Moreover,
the present uncertainty surrounding the social security system strengthens the
importance of protecting employees' interests in retirement plans. 20 0 Therefore,
a resolution of the conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits is needed.
Optimally, such a resolution should be accomplished through either judicial
or congressional adoption of the Greenwaldsolution.
KENNETI L. HospoRD
APPENDIX
I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976) Capital Gains Treatment for Portions of Lump Sum Distribution.
In the case of an employee trust described in section 501(a), so much of the total taxable
amount (as defined in subparagraph (D) of subsection (e)(4)) of a lump sum distribution as is equal to the product of such total taxable amount multiplied by a fraction (A) the numerator of which is the number of calendar years of active participation by
the employee in such plan before January 1, 1974, and (B) the denominator of which
is the number of calendar years of active years of active participation by the employee
in such plan, shall be treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset ....
For purposes of computing the fraction described in this paragraph and the fraction
under subsection (e)(4)(E), the Secretary may prescribe regulations under which plan
years may be used in lieu of calendar years. For purposes of this paragraph, in the case
of an individual who is an employee without regard to section 401(c)(1), determination
of whether or not any distribution is a lump sum distribution shall be made without
regard to the requirement that an election be made under subsection (e)(4)(B), but no
distribution to any taxpayer other than an individual, estate, or trust may be treated as
a lump sum distribution under this paragraph.
(b) Taxability of Beneficiary of Nonexempt Trust.
Contributions to an employee's trust made-by an employer during a taxable year of
the employer which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust for which the trust
is not exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be included in the gross income of
the employee in accordance with section 83 ....

(e)(4) Definitions and Special Rules.
(A) Lump Sum Distribution. For purposes of this section and section 403, the term
"lump sum distribution" means the distribution or payment within one taxable year
of the recipient of the balance to the credit of an employee which becomes payable to
the recipient- (i) on account of the employee's death, (ii) after the employee attains
age 59%, (iii) on account of the employee's separation from the service, or (iv) after
the employee has become disabled (within the meaning of section 72(m)(7)) from a
trust which forms a part of a plan described in section 401(a) and which is exempt
from tax under section 501 or from a plan described in section 403(a) ....
199. See Comment, Social Security - Will It Survive? Impact of Selected Cases and Legislation on the Future of Social Insurance,10 T x. TEcH. L. Rav. 997, 1009 (1979).
200. See Cohen, Social Security: Current Myths and Reality -The Need for its Preservation and Reform, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1419 (1979); Comment, supranote 199.
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